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A B S T R A C T
The World Bank is one of the leading organizations in the evaluation of development projects. It also 
makes results and methods more and more transparent. This paper uses the information to ‘evaluate’ 
the evaluator. We collect project evaluations of the World Bank in the Western Balkan for a period of 
ten years. We use this information to investigate the determinants of a) whether or not an evaluation has 
happened and b) what drives the results. We find that projects in poorer and less democratic countries 
are more likely to be evaluated. Once we control for this selection we also find that the evaluation 
scores for the bank and the partner institutions are correlated. We draw some normative conclusions on 
whether or not the World Bank should change its strategy of evaluation.
L I S T  O F  A C R O N Y M S
ADB Asian Development Bank
CGD Center for Global Development
DAC Development Assistance Committee
ECG Evaluation Cooperation Group
EU European Union
IMF International Monetary Fund
IEG Independent Evaluation Group
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OED Operations Evaluation Department
DFID UK Department for International Development
ISR Project Implementation Status and Results
ISCR Project Implementation Status and Completion Results
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1 .  I N T R O D U C T I O N
“In my eyes, Americans as well as other tax payers are quite ready to show more generosity. But one must 
convince them that their generosity will bear fruit, that there will be results.”
Paul Wolfowitz, President, World Bank
Academics and policymakers put increasing emphasis on the effectiveness of development assistance. 
However, the academic debate on aid effectiveness is highly controversial. On the one hand, scholars 
such as Easterly (2006), and Deaton (2013) argue that development assistance does have zero or even 
ineffective and harmful impact to the lives of poor people. On the other hand, scholars such as Sachs 
(2005), and Riddell (2007) argue that foreign aid has had an immense impact on reducing global 
poverty. Beyond the academic world, policy makers and international organizations note increasing 
pressure on aid budgets from  tax-payers demanding accountable and effective aid (OECD 2010).  Both 
the uncertainty surounding the effects of aid and the donors’ pleads for more accountability leed to an 
increasing demand for evaluating development assistance.
As a leading donor agency the World Bank has championed the rise in evaluation on a massive 
scale and publishes more and more information on evaluation results (Cracknell 1989). The World 
Bank defines evaluation as “the process of determining the worth or significance of a development 
activity, policy or program... to determine the relevance of objectives, the efficacy of design and 
implementation, the efficiency or resource use, and the sustainability of results. An evaluation should 
(enable) the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both partner and 
donor” (WB 2011). 
The Bank’s move towards more and better evaluation has found strong reasonance among parts 
of the academic community (Banerjee at al 2008, Duflo et al 2006). Yet, it also has provoked a lot of 
criticisms. Some economists doubt the feasibility of impact analysis for large socio-economic change 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2011, Easterly 2001&2006). Political economists and sociologists have criticized 
this impetus to quantify the unquantifiable and the technocracy of impact assessment for being both 
non- and highly political: non-political because it underestimates normative tradeoffs in aid; political 
in as much as it gives legitimacy only to certain types of projects and stakeholders but not others (e.g. 
Sanderson 2002).
The good news is that the available information provides ample opportunities to turn the 
evaluation on its ‘head’ and evaluate the evaluators. This can reveal important information not only 
about the evaluation process and its outcomes, but it can also inform a discussion whether or not to 
change the practice. For this purpose, we study the results of World Bank project evaluations. More 
specifically, we have selected over 100 World Bank projects implemented in Western Balkan1 over the 
last 10 years. 
We are interested in two types of questions, both of which are closely linked: a) when and why 
are projects evaluated (and results published); b) are there systematic trends in the results that might 
come from the evaluation process? Much of the process of evaluation is not accessible for third parties. 
Even if the World Bank tries to become more transparent and accountable, it still remains, to a certain 
extent, a black box. Thus, to answer these questions we employ a ‘naive’ reconstruction of the World 
1 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia
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Bank’s rationale: by looking at systematic patterns in the results we draw conclusions to the interior 
mechanisms of this black box. 
In practical terms, we investigate the empirical determinants for the likelihood of being evaluated 
and the evaluation results. We find that projects are more likely evaluated if they are implemented in 
poorer and less democratic countries. Sound institutions, which has been one of the World Bank’s 
prime concerns for the last decade, do seem to play less of a role. Once we control for these selection 
effects we find that the bank’s evaluation scores and those of the receiving institutions are correlated. 
This implies that the evaluation process for the World Bank and for its clients is not independent from 
each other.
These findings, though somewhat limited in geographic scope, have interesting normative 
implications. The fact that poverty and democracy play more of a role than good governance in a 
narrow sense, lends credibility to the idea that evaluation is, first and foremost, about accountability 
and, ultimately, the legitimacy of the World Bank itself. Moreover, the fact that the evaluation is non-
random could imply that an evaluation of the effectiveness of evaluation is limited. The fact that results 
of donor and recepient evaluations are correlated implies that the evaluation process may suffer from an 
admittedly moderate, but clearly visible bias in the evaluation technique.
To corroborate these claims we proceed in three steps. The next session  reviews the debate on aid 
effectiveness and the rationales given for evaluation. It   also   discusses   the   challenges   of   evaluating 
development aid. The third section briefly describes the World Bank’s approach to evaluation. This 
includes information about the Independent Expert Group (IEG), the responsible body for evaluations 
within the bank and outlines its procedures for evaluating  projects  which  will  also  be  used  in  data 
analysis.  The  fourth section presents  and analyzes the  data for the Western Balkan countries. The 
final section discusses the normative and positive implications of our results as well as their limits.
1.1. The Trend Towards Effectiveness and Accountability in Aid
The question whether aid works is as old as aid itself (Riddell  2007).  Scholars hold very different views 
about this. Critics such as William Easterly (2006), Angus Deaton (2013) or Dambisa Moyo (2009) 
argue that aid has failed to show any positive impact on development in third world countries. Others 
scholars such as Jeffrey Sachs (2005) defend the usefullness of aid. A ‘Salomonic’ middle ground seems 
to fall in between both extremes: Scholars like Collier & Dollar (1998), Alesina & Dollar (2000) have 
famously argued that aid is effective in the right context, and in particular only in those countries with 
sound institutions and sound macroeconomic policies. From an academic point of view, this claim may 
rest on feet of clay as much any other finding based on macroaggregate non-experimental statistics 
(Easterly et al. 2004 ). And yet, this middle ground has found considerable resonance with policy 
makers and has given those advocating evaluation an enormous stimulous. 
Two additional factors have increased the pressure of donors to evaluate their projects. First, the 
evaluation industry has seen its own revolution and increasing mainstreaming of using randomized 
experiments, due to their close collaboration between reserchers and implementers becuase they allow 
the estimation of certain parameters that couldn’t be otherwise evaluated (Banerjee et al 2008, 2011). 
Thus, the move towards randomized controlled trials has given the whole evaluation industry a big 
push. Second, and perhaps more importantly, budget-constrained governments feel pressure from tax 
payers who demand higher levels accountability and transparency in the use of public money (Cracknell 
2000; Hailey et al. 2005; OECD 2010). 
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Academics and donor agencies hold definitions of evaluation similar to the World Bank’s quoted 
above. For example, Michael Scriven, defines evaluation as “a process of determining merit, worth, or 
significance” (2007). CARE defines evaluation as “the periodic assessment, analysis and use of data 
about a project” (Barton 1997). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC), defines evaluation 
as “the systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed development intervention, its 
design, implementation and results” (OECD, DAC 2010). 
Despite these similarities, the purposes of evaluation are manifold and not always well aligned. 
A classic distinction is that evaluation has to do with proving that changes are taking place, and 
improving future aid interventions (Cracknell 2000). This distinction is closely related to two leitmotifs 
‘accountability’ and ‘lessons learned’. In this sense, ‘accountability’ means reporting your activities - the 
way you spend the money, to a higher authority, your principle  (Crawford et al. 2003). In this respect 
it is interesting to note that in the accountability framework most often the ultimate principles are the 
tax payers in donor countries, rather than the clients of the projects in recipient countries (Easterly 
2006). ‘Lessons learned’, on the other hand, has to do with identifying why certain activities failed and 
some others succeeded in reaching their objectives. In other words, it is much closer to the idea of aid 
effectivness.
Evaluations can also be done for formative and summative purposes. According to Scriven (1967), 
formative evaluations are used on the early stages of project development, while summative evaluations 
are conducted at the final phase of project life, in order to see the “final product”. Nowadays, formative 
evaluation is more often referred to as monitoring of outputs, wheras summative evaluations deals with 
outcomes for and impacts in society (Asian Development Bank 2006). Crawford and Bryce (2003) see 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) as “intimately linked”, and UNDP defines M&E as two processes 
that “differ but are closely related” (1997).
There is considerable disagreement about the normative goals of evaluation and performance 
measurement. Should evaluation be focussed on the classic trinity of efficiency, efficacy, and effectiveness? 
Or should it take a broader stance including socio-economic impact, considerations of equity and 
sustainability to name but a few (Checkland 2001, Crawford et al. 2004)? Given the multitude of 
normative goals (and their inherent tradeoffs) it is unlikely that any evaluation will reach consensus 
among all stakeholders. 
Closely related to the multiplicity of goals is the multiplicity of methods. For instance, impact 
evaluations can be of quantitative and qualitative nature (Asian Development Bank 2006, Baker 2000). 
However, due to the recent rise of the randomistas and the advocates of the ‘management by numbers’ 
quantitative approaches and their close kins are much more predominant than qualitative designs. 
The rise of the RCTs is particularly interesting also for the purposes of this paper. The experimental 
or randomized design works if treatment is applied randomly (Duflo et al 2003, Banerjee et al 2008, 
Baker 2000). Turning evaluation on its head would imply that evaluation itself should be randomized, 
especially in those context were it is very costly (see below). 
Purposes of evaluation will, finally also differ if the evaluation is conducted by an internal or an 
external body. According to Weiss (1998), both types has their own advantages and disadvantages with 
regard to “administrative confidence”, “objectivity”, “understanding of the program”, and “autonomy”. 
Proximity to objectivity and autonomy make external evaluation advantageous. Where however, an 
intimate understanding of the program is fundamental for a successful evaluation, it might be better 
to recur to internal evaluation processes. In a nutshell, internal evaluators can be more practical as 
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opposed to external, but internal evaluators are viewed as less credential when compared to external 
auditors who have more reputation. 
The multiplicity of purposes for evaluation is not the only problem of finding an adequate evaluation 
technique. There are at least three other major concerns: the involvement of politics, the high costs, and 
the validity of the measurement (Chelimsky 1987, Weiss 1973, Baker 2000, Cracknell 2000, Crawford 
et al. 2003). Starting with the first, the history of politics and evaluation is almost as old as evaluation 
itself (Chelimsky 1987). “A theory of evaluation must be as much a theory of political interaction as it 
is a theory of how to determine facts” states Lee Cronbach   (1980) (quoted on Chelimsky 1987). This 
implies that no evaluator, and hence no evaluation can be a-political. Another way that politics  gets 
involved in  evaluations is  through aid interventions providing social and economic changes which 
“attract” a range of stakeholders who want to see and show results to tax payers (Crawford et al. 2003). 
For instance, in many contexts RCTs are “politically unfeasible” (Grun 2006). 
Secondly, conducting evaluation requires the use of extra financial resources (ADB 2006), thereby 
making it  expensive for small –scale development agencies, or sometimes even for the bigger ones. This 
becomes a greater challenge considering due to the fact that donor agencies are mainly the ones who 
pay for the evaluation. The donor agencies will also influence the choice of indicators for the evaluation 
of a developmental activity (Bamberger 2000). A well- designed evaluation includes for professional 
evaluators and extensive data collection which raises the cost of evaluation (Crawford et al.2004). For 
these reasons, not all projects are evaluated. But if so, the decision which projects are evaluated and why 
becomes an important one. 
The third challenge concerns a group of developmental activities that are more complicated to 
measure due to their less tangible processes. Projects such as capacity building tend to be described as 
“ill-defined” processes which present another evaluation hurdle for development community (Hailey 
et al. 2005; Kuehl 2009). Complexity can pose serious limits to perform an encompassing type of 
evaluation (Taylor 2003). It also increases the risk of meaasurement  error,  especially in the course 
of ‘converting’ qualitative data into quantitative scores.   Among others the USAID has criticized the 
subjective nature of capacity building projects which can lead to “false” measurements of developmental 
results (USAID 2000). 
To sum up, all the multiplicity of evaluation purposes as well as the practical hurldes lead to 
the fact that every type of evaluation will ultimately be political, partial and selective. Evaluation has 
become a crucial and a widely used tool in the development community but its main stimulus seems 
to come from the debates about aid effectiveness and aid accountability (Naonobu et al. 2009). The 
tax-payers want to see if their taxes are being spent efficiently, and if that is making any difference in 
the life of others, because that portrays the basic purpose behind all the money spend by development 
agencies (Riddell 2007).  
1.2. The World Bank’s Process of Evaluation
Over the last 40 years the World Bank has invested considerable time and resources on improving its 
evaluation techniques (Cracknell 1989; Grasso et al. 2003). The Operations Evaluation Department 
(OED) started in 1970 and soon gained independence by choosing its own director, and by reporting 
directly to the board of directors (Grasso et al. 2003). Reporting directly to the board leaves less  room 
for  influence  by directors of developmental  activities. In 2005 the OED became the Independent 
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Evaluation Group (IEG). IEG is the only independent body in WB structures in charge of evaluating 
developmental activities including programs, projects, and policies. 
Officially, IEG’s main aim is to evaluate the effectiveness of (aid) interventions (IEG 2013, 
Pitman et al. 2005, Tuan 2012). In particular, it assesses the “relevance”, “efficiency”, and “efficacy” 
of WB developmental activities in order to measure the contribution of WB in achieving greater 
developmental effectiveness. According to a recent self-evaluation, the IEG certifies its mission, purpose 
and independence from the World Bank group (IEG 2011, Linn 2012). 
The evaluation process itself, however, is not easy to review as an outsider to IEG. The details of 
the evaluation process, the identities of the evaluators and the precise methodology and justification of 
the performance measures can only be reconstructed post hoc.
In contrast, overall transparency of evaluation results has increased considerably over time. The 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) have committed themselves to strengthening the 
effectiveness of aid. The criteria of 1991 DAC/OECD report included effectiveness, efficiency, impact, 
relevance, and sustainability. Part of the report discussed the involvement of other stakeholders which 
represents the intended beneficiaries and also those indirectly affected by the aid intervention, in the 
evaluation process. In the last 20 years, the DAC criteria have spread throughout the development 
community (Chianca 2008). 
In accordance with these donor initiatives, the World Bank publishes all its evaluations online in 
its Projects Database (The World Bank Group 2013). According to IEG, the WB Project Performance 
Rating database is the oldest database of its kind that includes about 8000 project evaluations since 
its establishment (WB Rating). IEG provides two types of reports for project evaluations: the Project 
Implementation Status and Results (ISR), and Project Implementation Status and Completion 
Results (ISCR). 
The ISR is a standardized, four page document that includes basic information about the project 
such as title, country, status, sector, approval date, closing date, and commitment amount. The ISR 
also summarizes main objectives of the project, and offers a yes or no answer on the achievement of 
objectives (PISR, 2012). Another important part of the ISR are the “results indicators“. Each result 
indicator in the ISR has the name, the “unit of measure”, the “baseline”, the “current”, and the “end 
target”. “Unit of measure” depends on the type of indicator chosen. For example, units could be 
measured in days, or it could be a simple yes or no answer. The “baseline” measures the situation before 
the aid intervention take places. The “current” data is measured during the project  life and  shows  the 
situation  by the time project  is  measured.    The “end  target” is measured after the project is finished 
and in a way shows if the objectives are achieved. All in all, the ISR gives a compact if somewhat 
stylized picture at a point in the life cycle of the project.
Compared to the ISR, the ISCR is a longer report provides more information about the project life 
and end results. It is not a standardized form in terms of page number or the amount of information 
per section, albeit it has similar sections in each evaluation report including the basic info about the 
project, a summary, the relevance and outcomes. Nowadays, three types performance ratings are 
available (WB Ratings): 
•	 Project outcome performance is a rating that “captures the extent to which a 
project’smajor relevant objectives were achieved or are expected to be achieved, 
efficiently” (IEG 2011).
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•	 Bank performance  evaluates the quality of services the WB provides to its beneficiaries, 
at the beginning and throughout the project life cycle (OED 2005).
•	 Borrower performance evaluates  the  performance of the beneficiary. OED (2005) 
defines this rating as the degree to which the borrower shows willingness and ability 
to guarantee and comply with the criteria and requirements agreed with the bank.
The three performances are rated using the same six scales including highly satisfactory, satisfactory, 
moderately satisfactory, moderately unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, and highly satisfactory, as shown 
below in Table 1 .
Table 1. IEG Performance Rating Scales
Scales Explanation
1 Highly Satisfactory No shortcomings in identification, preparation, or appraisal
2 Satisfactory Minor shortcomings in identification, preparation, or appraisal
3 Moderately Satisfactory Moderate shortcomings in identification, preparation, or appraisal
4 Moderately Unsatisfactory Significant shortcomings in identification, preparation, or appraisal
5 Unsatisfactory Major shortcomings in identification, preparation, or appraisal
6 Highly Unsatisfactory Severe shortcomings in identification, preparation, or appraisal
Source: Author’s compilation based on  2005 OED report
2 .  D ATA  A N A LY S I S  A N D  R E S U LT S
We collected data from the World Bank dataset on “Projects and Operations” on a total of 109 
implemented projects in the Western Balkan for a period of ten years. The information includes the 
project name, country, approval date, closing date, commitment amount, % spend in each sector for 
each project (usually a project is spread into several sectors), intermediate results indicator which are 
conducted while the project is running, implementation completion results report which is conducted 
at the end phase of the project cycle, project outcome performance, bank and borrower performance. 
The projects implemented show a considerable variety over sectors and the size ranges from 0.1 to 
111 million $. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of our data. We see for instance, that the project 
amounts of evaluated an non-evaluated differ from country to country. For our purposes it is most 
interesting to note that not all projects were evaluated (or the evaluation published): only 68 out of 109 
projects have an evaluation report. The shares range from only every second project in Serbia to more 
than 80 percent in Macedonia. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Country Albania B & H Kosovo Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Total
Evaluated? 0.67 0.45 0.67 0.81 0.7 0.54 0.62
Outcome Performance 3.31 3.33 3.6 3.31 3.14 3.85 3.44
Borrower Performance 3.06 3.63 3.44 3.18 3.8 3.75 3.41
Bank Performance 3.31 3.5 3.56 3.42 3.5 3.67 3.48
Amount 10.86 18.39 4.88 19.63 14.9 37.3 18.9
GDP p.c. 2.76 3.18 2.49 3.34 4.88 4.1 3.37
Poverty Headcount 17.83 15.33 36.78 19.3 8.33 9.62 17.81
V & A 0.06 0.12 -0.39 0.05 0.18 0.04 0.02
Government Effectiveness -0.48 -0.71 -0.34 -0.17 0.07 -0.27 -0.38
RoL -0.74 -0.52 -0.87 -0.4 -0.15 -0.68 -0.6
Source: Authors compilation based on the dataset created based on World Bank data-base
This prompts the question what makes a project being evaluated or not. We should expect that 
several factors make projectes more likely to be (publically) evaluated: First, higher salience, measured 
by higher project sums, should increase the likelihood of evaluation. Second, since it is the World 
Bank’s mission to eradicate poverty, it might be especially sensitive to context of high poverty. Hence 
we should think that projects in countries with higher poverty rates or lower GDP per capita are more 
likely to be evaluated. Third, since the World Bank seems to be believe that effectiveness depends on the 
quality of domestic institutions and policies (see above), we would also expect that projects in countries 
with lower levels of good governance should be more likely scrutinized. Fourth, if, however, the World 
Bank is more concerned about accountability and ultimately its own legitimacy towards its principles 
we should expect that political indicators such as democracy should be more relevant.
To reconstruct the World Bank’s rationale we performed some simple comparisons of means 
tests between the two subgroups: projects evaluated, projects not evaluated. Table 3 shows the results. 
Going through the list of variables, we find that project sum (amount committed) does not seem to 
be markedly different for the two subgroups. For both groups the average is around 19$ million. The 
mean for those evaluated is some two millions higher, but the difference is not large enough to justify 
systematic tendencies in the data. Indicators of wealth and poverty, however, do suggest some effect. 
GDP per capita of the country is some 850$ lower in those projects that were evaluated. The difference 
is one fourth of the average GDP p.c. in the region and large enough to suggest a systematic pattern. 
Similar things apply to poverty measures, in this case the poverty headcount (World Bank Data). 
Evaluated projects are in countries with a poverty headcount of 1.5 times of the poverty headcount of 
countries whose projects were not evaluated. 
As for the indicators of good governance it is interesting to note that the strongest results seem to 
come from Voice & Accountability (V&A). The World Bank defines V&A as “measuring perceptions 
of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media” (Kaufmann et al, 2008; Thomas 2010 
). Table 3 suggests that projects evaluated tend to be more often in countries with weaker indices of 
V&A then projects not evaluated. In turn, Government Effectiveness (GE), shows no systematic effect. 
GE is defined as “measuring the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree 
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of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.” This is remarkable as one would 
expect that if the World Bank prioritizes effectiveness, government effectiveness should be an important 
context factor. The results, however, seems to suggest that the purpose of evaluation is more related to 
accountability of the World Bank in political terms, than to aid effectiveness in a narrow sense. 
As for the third indicator, Rule of Law (RoL) we do find some systematic differences. As expected, 
projects are more likely to be evaluated in context where RoL is weak. RoL is defined as “measuring 
perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence.” This finding seems to imply that the World Bank is also concerned about aid 
effectivess in highly unstable contexts, but the effect is much less visible than the one for V&A.
Table 3. T-Tests Comparing Evaluated and Non-Evaluated Projects
mean difference sign. std. err. nobs.
Amount 18.9 2.12 5.36 109
Gdp p.c. 3372.55 -849.54 *** 246.32 109
Poverty headcount 17.81 8.05 *** 2.51 53
V&A 0.015 -0.11 *** 0.04 109
Gov. Effectiveness -0.38 0.01 0.05 98
RoL -0.60 -0.09 * 0.05 109
Levels of Significance: * < .1; ** <.05; *** <.01
To conclude, our somewhat naive reconstruction of the World Bank’s motives implies that project 
evaluation is not completely random, but focusses on projects in poorer countries. It also seems to be 
strongest related to issues of V&A and hence more consistent with the idea that the World Bank does 
it for purposes of self-legitimization than for matters of aid effectiveness. This is important information 
in itself (see below), but the reasons for selecting projects for evaluation might also loom large into the 
actual performance measures of the evaluated projects. This is what we turn to now.
This section assess the 68 projects that have evaluation reports with detailed information as 
opposed to non-evaluated projects which have only specific information available such as commitment 
amount. Apart from general data including country, commited amount, the information found in the 
evaluation reports consists also of data such as outcome performance, bank   performance,   borrower 
performance. Table 2 showed the country averages range between satisfactory and highly satisfactory. 
Some countries such as Serbia have a higher average than others like Montenegro. However, as the 
previous section has made clear, this may be due to selection effects. What we don’t see is how non-
evaluated projects would have fared. Are Serbian projects really better, or do we just not see the other 
half of the Serbian projects? 
A good start into these questions is by merely looking at simple pairwise correlations between 
these three performance indices. Table 4 shows the results.
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Table 4. Correlations between Performance Indices
 Outcome Performance Bank Performance Borrower Performance
Outcome Performance 1
Bank Performance
0.29**
(0.04)
49
1
Borrower Performance
0.64***
(0.00)
61
0.10
(0.51)
46
1
Levels of Significance: * < .1; ** <.05; *** <.01
The results show that the overall performance primarily depends on the borrower’s performance, 
but also on the bank’s performance. This is logical and to be expected, since the overall performance 
should be closely related to the evaluation of the two partners involved. We also see that the borrower’s 
performance and the bank’s performance are not correlated. This is a good sign of an evaluation method. 
Correlation between bank’s and borrower’s performance would imply that both parts might bias each 
other and that the evaluation outcome is hard to interpret. The fact that we do not find a correlation 
lends credibility to the claim that the evaluation is independent and neutral. 
However, the previous section has shown that the selection of who is evaluated or not is not 
random. It is therefore crucial to see whether the selection has larger implications also for the results of 
the evaluation process. For this purpose we run some statistical analyses that predict the performance 
indicator with the help of other variables. The first step lies in converting qualitative assessments into 
numeric scores, ranging from the lowest (1) ‘unsatisfactory’ to the highest (5) ‘highly satisfactory’. A 
look at the descriptives in table 2 shows that the regional averages performance values are very similar to 
each other (ranging between 3.41 and 3.48). There does not seem to be any systematic tendency against 
either borrower or the bank.
The next step is to run some simple regressions with the performance measures as dependent 
variables.2 
2 The data is essentially ordinal in nature so we should run ordinal regressions. However, the number of observations is not very 
large which poses a problem for methods based on maximum likelihood. Moreover the results essentially confirm the simpler 
analysis so we decided not to report them. They are available on request.
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Table 5. Bank and Borrowers’ performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank Value Bank Value Bank Value Borrower Value
Borrower 
Value
Borrower 
Value
Poverty -0.000438 -0.0175 -0.0169 -0.0167 0.00308 0.00139
[0.023] [0.026] [0.020] [0.035] [0.042] [0.038]
GDP p. c. 0.424*** 0.0235 0.136 -0.0756
[0.172] [0.305] [0.143] [0.492]
V& A -1.272 -1.626* -1.517 -0.972 0.890 0.633
[0.875] [0.885] [1.017] [1.347] [1.542] [1.852]
Borrower Value 0.269* 0.269***
[0.132] [0.116]
Bank Value 0.701* 0.705***
[0.343] [0.304]
Constant 2.015*** 2.433* 2.527*** 3.269*** 1.445 1.190
[0.782] [1.304] [0.531] [0.925] [2.274] [1.185]
Selection Stage
GDP p. c. -1.434*** -1.697***
[0.601] [0.650]
V& A -4.817*** -9.559***
[2.443] [4.305]
Poverty -0.136*** -0.260***
[0.069] [0.120]
Constant 6.982*** 10.16***
[2.644] [3.726]
athrho -0.192 0.192
_cons [1.064] [0.829]
lnsigma -1.008*** -0.531***
_cons [0.165] [0.153]
N 29 23 47 34 23 42
R2 0.225 0.379 0.053 0.191
Standard errors in brackets
* p < 0.10, *** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
The table 5 shows six different regressions. The first three are for the bank’s performance and the 
other three are for the borrower’s performance as the dependent variables. In each case, the first model 
is the baseline and includes the (statistically significant) variables of the selection stage: GDP per capita, 
poverty and V&A. These variables are meant to capture the non-randomness of the evaluation. The 
second (and fifth) model include the other performance measure to check for the covariation between 
the bank’s and the borrower’s evaluation. Models (3) and (6) perform the same analysis, but in a 
Heckman selection framework. The Heckman model explicitly captures the selection bias which might 
arise due to the non-randomness of the data (Heckman 1979). 
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Let us start with models (1) and (4). We see that the bank’s performance seems to be better in 
countries with higher GDP per capita. The borrower’s performance shows no such results. Poverty and 
V&A don’t seem to affect the results very much. However, if we plug in the value’s for the borrower 
(model (2)) and the bank (model (5)), we do find that they are positively correlated with each other. 
This is an interesting contrast to the previous simple correlations where we did not find any effect. It 
seems that, by controlling for other determinants such as GDP p.c. or V&A, we do find a systematic 
relationship between both performance measures. The last models (3) and (6) do repeat this finding: 
the bank’s and the borrower’s performance co-vary. However, we don’t find direct evidence for selection 
bias, i.e. the non-randomness of the evaluation does not affect the performance data directly. This 
essentially means that both types of regression in the Heckman model, those for the selection stage, 
and those for the performance stage can be run independently from each other. The lower half of the 
Heckman models shows this ‘selection stage’, i.e. whether or not a project has been evaluated or not. 
Essentially it repeats the findings of the simpler t-tests of Table 3.
All in all, the findings raise some concerns about the World Bank’s approach to evaluation. 
Apparently, after controlling for mainly country-specific factors we do find a co-variation between 
the bank’s and the borrower’s evaluation. But if so, how could we tell who is responsible for the final 
outcome, the borrower, the Bank, or even the biased evaluator? This is an interesting point for the 
discussion. Moreover, if the selection of projects evaluated or not is non-random, how sure can we be 
about claims like the one between good governance and aid effectiveness? Among others, Isham et 
al. (1997) claim that development projects have better return on investment in countries with better 
governance and accountability. How sure are we that this is true, if evaluation is not present everywhere?
As further checks we also disaggregated the projects into sectors such as economic, law, trade, 
industry, telecommunication, mining, agriculture, energy, security, public administration, health, 
central administration, labor, social welfare, and the like. Table 6 shows the number of projects and the 
total project sums for each of the main sectors.3 
Table 6. World Bank Projects Differentiated by Sector
Mining 
& 
Energy
Health/
Labor/
Social 
Welfare
Edu-
cation
Economy/
Finance/
Banking
Public 
Admin-
istration
Justice/ 
Law/
Security
Agri- 
culture/
Forestry/
Rural
Infra-
structure/
Telecom-
munication
Trade & 
Industry
Total 
Number of 
Projects
14 31 7 9 51 8 12 10 14
Share 
evaluated
14 31 7 9 51 8 12 10 14
Total 
Amount
293.75 638.7 69.5 354.21 886.39 183.41 139.02 239.75 389.3
Average of 
Amount
20.98 20.60 9.93 39.36 17.38 22.93 11.59 23.98 27.81
3 Some projects span several sectors so we weighted them according to the relative share of project money that goes into each 
sector
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Average 
Evaluation 
Bank
2.79 3.45 3.14 3.11 3.12 3.63 3.25 3.40 3.57
Average 
Evaluation 
Borrower
2.64 3.39 3.57 3.00 3.02 3.63 3.08 3.10 3.57
Average 
Evaluation 
Outcome
3.57 3.55 3.57 3.78 3.02 3.63 3.58 3.30 3.79
We see that two sectors stand out and combine almost 50% of all projects: ‘public administration’ 
and ‘health, social and labour issues’. When it comes to amounts spent the differences to other sectors 
is less obvious, as ‘economy, finance and banking’ or ‘minining and energy’ also received considerable 
amounts. The best ratings, however, are found in economy & banking and trade & industry. The 
worst in mining & energy. Hence, the sectoral differences, are not huge, but clearly visible. While the 
numbers are too small to draw any statistical inferences, the sectoral differences may also constitute a 
source of bias in the evaluation technique.
3 .  P O S I T I V E  A N D  N O R M AT I V E  D I S C U S S I O N
Our paper asked two types of questions: When and why are evaluations done, and what are the results? 
Hence we have found two types of results as answers to these questions: those about the determinants 
of what makes a project being evaluated, and what makes a project being highly or lowly rated.
As for the first type of results we found that evaluation seems to be more about accountability than 
effectiveness. To be clear, the results are not beyond any doubt. For instance, future research should 
check whether similar things apply to projects in other regions. Yet the finding is interesting and worth 
further inspection. Is accountability the main reason and what role does  effectiveness really play? 
Many critical scholars like Moran, Rein and Goodin (2006)  would argue it is more about the former, 
and more about the World Bank’s legitimacy than actual learning exercises. Now, accountability is no 
bad thing at all, but if it does not lead to other positive results it is somewhat ‘toothless’. 
The non-randomness also precludes, to some extent, the evaluation of evaluations. If the evaluation 
is not random, it is much harder to identify the effects of evaluations. For instance, it is much harder 
to find out whether countries/ clients improve their performance because they fear the negative impact 
of evaluation or not. The non-randomness makes it also much more difficult to control the quality of 
the evaluations  (Duflo et al 2003, Banerjee et al 2008). Eventually, these problems carry over to the 
actual results of evaluations. When it comes to performance measurement, there are numerous and 
well-known problems of quantifying the ‘unquantifiable’. However, our results show that even within 
the technocratic vision of the World Bank it might be difficult to avoid bias between the assessment of 
the bank and the borrower. 
Again our results are somewhat preliminary and should be substantiated with more sophisticated 
analysis, better and more data. Yet they show how difficult a ‘neutral’ evaluation process is in practice. 
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This is all the more a problem, if the organization implementing the evaluation is not completely 
independent from the World Bank (Weiss 1998). Of course, it is difficult to perform an anonymous 
peer-review procedure with something as prominent as a World Bank project. However, there are 
solutions: One is to divulge even more information than as of now about the evaluation process. To 
make a concrete example: it would be very helpful if the names and biographies of the evaluators were 
known in each case. This is very helpful information, because one would be able to reconstruct ‘the 
priors’ of individuals as well as their relationship to the Bank or the borrower. In general, making the 
methodology and the process of the evaluations more transparent would not only help to increase 
accountability but also effectiveness of the evaluation process.
All in all, the World Bank has come a long way in the way how it deals with performance, 
evaluation and transparency. Given the openness one can only hope that this will stimulate further 
steps towards an even more open and transparent evaluation procedure in the future. 
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